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Abstract: 
 
The past decade has produced significant change in how the public and private sectors 
operate and the public expectations of their role. This paper claims that the pressures that 
have challenged the governance structures of key public and private organisations in the 
UK and Australia are common to both sectors. It argues that the ‘independent regulatory 
agencies’ of the public sector and publicly listed companies in the private sector have 
evolved in ways that point to a common template of organisational governance and 
response to crisis. The dynamic of both organisations was forged through the large-scale 
privatisations of the past decade and the reaction to the loss of collective public 
ownership.  
 
The paper assesses similarities in the governance of regulatory agencies and listed 
companies according to four broad criteria: performance, conformance, credibility and 
trust. It highlights the initial establishment of a principal-agent framework; the 
politicisation and placement of unrealistic expectations on CEO performance; the 
subsequent onset of forms of regulatory crisis; a process of restoring trust through a mix 
of tighter regulation and corporate governance standards; and greater participative 
consultation among stakeholders. Comparisons between public and private sector 
governance also identify similarities in the British and Australian experience. 
 
 
Glossary 
CAC  Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act  
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
CSR  Corporate Social Responsibility 
FMA  Financial Management and Accountability Act 
IRA  independent regulatory agency 
PLC  publicly listed company 
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Introduction 
This article examines two key consequences of the modern era of privatisation and financial 
deregulation in the British and Australian experience. The first relates to the role of the public 
sector and the shift from the state as a provider of services to that of a regulator of commercial 
contractors, with devolved independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) given responsibility for 
enforcing specific laws in the public interest. The second relates to the operation of privatised 
(publicly listed) companies and their focus on ‘shareholder value’ as a guiding philosophy.  
Together, the regulatory emphasis of IRAs and the goal of higher share prices of publicly listed 
companies (PLCs) have shifted the responsibilities between the public and private sectors. Rather 
than public agencies being accountable to citizens for the direct provision of rail, postal, 
electricity, water, telecommunications and employment services, they became responsible for 
regulating the private providers, primarily to ensure low prices for consumers. Rather than 
company directors enjoying autonomy to manage in the company’s interests, privatisation and 
the revolution in financial markets meant that boards and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) became 
stringently judged according to share market value. These changes reflect the public sector’s 
endorsement of corporate values and market signals, the private sector’s adoption of these signals 
as a systemic guide to performance, and the resultant need for both public and private 
organisations to devolve their operations.  
 
Parts 1 and 2 of this article sketch these two trends in the British and Australian experience.1 Part 
3 examines the reasons for subsequent crisis. Part 4 identifies the issues of corporate governance 
and stakeholder relations as the key challenges facing both IRAs and PLCs into the 21st century. 
After 20 years of privatisation and financial liberalisation, both the regulatory state and the 
philosophy of shareholder value have suffered major institutional failures. In response, regulatory 
agencies have required a sharper focus on issues of governance - rather than law - which 
improves coordination between state agencies (vertical governance) as well as these agencies’ 
relations with their societal stakeholders (horizontal governance). Similarly, publicly listed 
companies have needed to provide greater accountability and transparency for their shareholders 
while at the same time broadening their responsibilities to stakeholders (consumers, suppliers, 
community groups, environmental interests).  
                                                 
1 These countries are chosen for their common policy of privatisation and financial deregulation, the 
development of independent regulatory agencies, their private sectors’ endorsement of ‘shareholder value’ 
and the resultant ‘principal-agent’ framework in both sectors. The American regulatory state is somewhat 
different in that it was not based on privatisation but a cultural preference for private economic activity and 
a concomitant requirement for the state to steer that activity (see Scott 2001).  
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 The article is interested in the shifts of public and private sector organisation flowing from 
privatisation and financial liberalisation, and in their similar responses to institutional crisis as a 
result of these shifts. It is not immediately concerned with the influence of regulatory agencies 
and publicly listed companies upon each other. There have been obvious strong linkages between 
the two with the regulation of financial markets, codes of corporate governance and public 
agencies’ adoption of the private sector corporations’ legislation. While these connections are 
duly noted, the focus is on plotting the patterns of the governing philosophy and institutional 
development of each sector. 
 
1. The Regulatory State 
Privatisation and an increasingly competitive financial sector have changed the institutional 
structure of governments. As key public services have shifted to private providers and markets 
have become more susceptible to anti-competitive behaviour, generalist bureaucracies and 
hierarchical control have been usurped by ‘independent regulatory agencies’ (IRAs). These 
specialised agencies focus on specific regulatory objectives, often prescribed by an Act of 
Parliament, and are thereby independent from executive government and elected politicians 
(Majone 1997, pp152-55; Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin 2001, p24). The creation of IRAs has led to 
new classifications of administrative organization, defined by their distance from Parliament and 
executive government and their regulatory powers (see Hood 1978, 2000). ‘New public 
management’ made a distinction between the executive core, the semi-corporate service delivery 
agencies and the regulatory agencies. Both Britain and Australia have delegated extensively, 
establishing independent agencies for the regulation of utility competition and in financial, social 
and environmental fields (See Table 1). Australian government agencies with explicit regulatory 
functions employed around 30,000 staff and spent $4.5 billion in 2001-2002 (Banks 2004). 
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 TABLE 1 
 Britain Australia 
General competition Competition Commission 1998 
Office of Fair Trading 1973 
Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC)* 
Telecommunications Office of Telecommunications 
1984 
Australian Communications Authority 1997# 
Energy Office of Gas & Electricity Markets 
2000 
Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator 
2001*, ACCC 
Aviation Civil Aviation Authority Civil Aviation Safety Authority 1995#! 
Water Office of Water Services 1989 State Environmental Protection Agencies* 
Railways Office of Rail Regulator 1999 State franchises (eg RailCorp in NSW) 
regulated by State governments and 
federally by ACCC  
Postal Services Postal Services Commission 1999 ACCC, Self-regulation by Australia Post 
Media Independent Television 
Commission 1990 
Australian Broadcasting Authority 1992# 
 
Stock exchange Financial Services Authority 1997 Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 
(APRA) 2002# 
Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) 1991# 
Environment Environment Agency 1996 Australian Greenhouse Office 1998-2004* 
Food Safety Food Standards Agency 1999 Food Standards Australia New Zealand# 
Source: Thatcher 2002, p143, DoFA 2003. The date relates to the year the agency was established. 
 
* As of 1997, these Australian regulatory agencies are subject to the Financial Management and 
Accountability Act, where the CEO is accountable to the Minister and ultimately accountable for the 
performance of the agency. 
# As of 1997, these Australian regulators are subject to the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 
which requires a board to which the CEO and management are accountable. The relevant Minister elects the 
board of directors who are responsible for developing a corporate plan and informing the Minister of major 
events. The ACCC and ASIC are also subject to the Financial Management and Accountability Act (1997). 
! In October 2003, legislation was introduced proposing the abolition of the CASA Board. 
 
 
The principal-agent framework and functional focus 
Much of the academic literature on the regulatory state has been devoted to the reasons for its 
emergence (Thatcher 2001; Moran 2002; Majone 1994; Moran 2002). Prima facie, it is puzzling 
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that governments should cede power to agencies at arms-length from the executive. It would 
seem only logical that executive agencies oversee regulation of privatised utilities to ensure close 
Ministerial involvement. Yet IRAs were favoured precisely because they were free from elected 
political influence. The argument is that delegation improves electoral legitimacy and is essentially 
a response to general public cynicism with traditional modes of governance (Davis and Keating 
2000, p10). In the absence of political flexibility, citizens and investors are likely to be more 
assured of optimal policy outcomes than if the process was left to politicians’ discretion. While 
the public may not care which government agencies deliver the needed goods and services (Kettl 
2000, p488), governments have guarded against the perception that privatised public assets have 
become their political pawns. This is the basis of the ‘credibility hypothesis’, which argues that 
fixing policy settings or delegating to external powers actually increases a government’s 
credibility (Kydland and Prescott 1977; Shepsle 1991; Majone 1997). Delegation to regulatory 
authorities overcomes the ‘short-term horizons imposed by the democratic process’ (Gilardi 2002) 
often through a legal mandate. The regulatory state was formed to instill trust among citizens 
that the privatised asset would be properly managed and that competition rules would be 
administered equitably for existing and potential private providers. It has been argued, for 
instance, that regulation without political influence is a better guarantor that safety standards 
will be upheld, that service obligations will be met, and that multi-national investors will be lured 
(Levy and Spiller 1996; Henisz 2000; Gilardi 2002). 
 
A second rationale for delegating regulation is more practical but it too deals with the issue of 
credibility. The basic argument is that delegated agencies have more knowledge and expertise in 
dealing with private providers than a generalised bureaucracy (Rose and Miller 1992). For 
regulators to be effective and to be taken seriously, they must be focused in their goal and well 
positioned to influence the social responsibility of those they regulate (Braithwaite 1999). Majone 
(1994, p81) defines effective regulation in terms of ‘detailed knowledge of and intimate 
involvement with the regulated activity.  [This will] necessitate the creation of specialised 
agencies entrusted with fact-finding, rule making and enforcement’. The devolution of 
governance associated with the regulatory state is a product of the technocratic demands of 
specific public objectives (McGowan and Wallace 1996, p562). Effective regulation requires 
specialisation, which requires closer contact with stakeholders than the traditional Westminster 
model allows. This proximity establishes institutional autonomy or ‘negative coordination’ (Scarpf 
1994, p39; Jayasuria 2001, p104) as a key feature of the regulatory state. Rather than a process of 
bargaining between ministerial units (positive coordination), the devolution of agencies is 
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designed to minimise conflicts between the objectives of these independent regulatory 
institutions. 
 
The regulatory state has been developed upon a principal-agent framework, which separates 
ownership from management. The reasons for delegation have mainly been functional, reflecting 
a desire by the executive to shift blame, to develop greater trust among citizens, and to build the 
technical expertise necessary to cope in an increasingly complex and international regulatory 
environment. Circumstantial factors have also contributed. In Britain, delegation has been an 
institutional response to policy problems (Thatcher 2002b, p143). Underpinning both these 
explanations, the principal-agent framework of the regulatory state reflected the climate created 
by privatisation and deregulated financial markets. 
 
Politicisation and outcomes 
Despite these arguments supporting the credibility and autonomy of independent regulators, their 
role has not been depoliticised. The privatisation of key public assets has ensured a high level of 
partisan and media scrutiny. In the UK and Australia, regulatory authorities have become quasi 
republics with a prominent, entrepreneurial leader often pursuing his / her own regulatory agenda 
(Hall, Scott and Hood 1998; Goggin 2000; Thatcher 2002, p140; Brenchley 2003). Many regulatory 
agencies in Australia and the UK have adopted a corporate structure with the CEO appointed by 
the relevant Minister, answerable to a board and responsible for the operation of a budget (see 
Table 1). While an Act of Parliament guides regulators, the style and targets of enforcement are 
often indicators of the vigilance of the chief regulator. Legislative changes have reinforced the 
CEO-style image of regulatory chiefs (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Devolution has meant that the 
responsibilities of public sector CEOs have ‘probably never been greater’, while changes to the 
legislative framework have aligned their duties more closely with those of private sector CEOs 
(Barrett 2002).  
 
Still, Parliament sets the framework for regulation and thereby provides governments and 
opposition parties with avenues for involvement. IRAs may have diluted the practice of ministerial 
responsibility, but partisan politics ensures that the performance of these agencies is not 
neglected. The British Labor government, for example, strongly supported the initiative of the rail 
regulator to reform its regulatory institutions to oversee more effectively the privatised franchises 
(Moran 2001, p27). Similarly, the issue of service provision has been of strong partisan concern in 
regulating the Australian public Telco. In addition to scrutiny from independent 
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telecommunications and competition regulators, the case for placing majority ownership of 
Telstra in private hands has been the subject of intense parliamentary debate and of inquiry as to 
whether the company currently meets universal service standards. While devolved regulation may 
give credibility to the regulatory process, the importance of the services provided by the 
privatised companies, coupled with the eagerness of governments to ensure the success of 
privatisation, has inevitably politicised the regulatory state. Credibility of process led to the rise of 
IRAs; credibility of outcomes has ensured political participation (and coercion) in the regulatory 
process. I will look at the harm caused by outcome-based party-political influence in the 
regulatory state in Part 3. 
 
Transparency and trust 
In operational terms, this basic tension between devolving regulation to IRAs while maintaining 
executive oversight has been bridged by the use of audits (Power 1994, p15). An important sub-
theme of this article is the influence of private sector administration on the regulatory state. The 
exemplar is the use of auditing, both government audits of its own agencies and these agencies’ 
audits of private sector corporations. Within the British and Australian governments, National 
Audit Offices scrutinize the financial statements and administration of public sector entities on 
behalf of Parliament, the executive, Boards, Chief Executive Officers, and the public. They report 
on the efficiency and effectiveness with which government bodies have used public money 
(National Audit Office 2000). The internal audit process of government agencies is established by 
legislation. Many Australian IRAs are governed by the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies 
Act (CAC Act 1997), which requires the directors of the Authority to inform the relevant Minister 
of its operations (Edwards et al. 2003, p30).2 The CAC Act contains duties of care, business 
judgement and individual liability that correspond closely to the provisions of the (private sector) 
Corporations Act (2001). Table 1 shows that Australia’s key corporate regulators (ACCC and ASIC) 
are also governed by the Financial Management and Accountability Act (1997) which makes the 
agency’s CEO ultimately responsible for the performance of the company, the implementation of 
a fraud plan (s45) and the creation of an audit committee (s46). British utilities have traditionally 
been governed by an FMA-style single person structure in the form of a non-ministerial 
government department although this is slowly changing toward the European-style multi-person 
board (see Thatcher 2002, p130).  
 
                                                 
2  Many ‘CAC Agencies’ are also prominent regulators including the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and the Health Insurance Commission.  
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The regulatory state is defined by the use of audits and controls by IRAs themselves, 
notwithstanding the increasing influence of elected officials over their operation. Similarly to the 
Audit Office, IRAs use the tools and language of the audit process to give assurance to Parliament 
and the executive that the bodies that they oversee — whether universities, the medical 
profession, airlines or private corporations — are complying with an industry or consumer 
standard. Moreover, the power of the newly privatised business sector has heightened pressures 
for audits to control monopoly, enforce competition and manage social damage caused by 
externalities (Prosser 1997, pp10-11). The upshot is a system in which the regulation of the 
private sector and professional bodies is devolved to independent public agencies in order to 
ensure credibility. And these agencies, through legally defined responsibilities and the 
independent checks of an Audit Office, inform the executive and the legislature of their own 
financial records and regulatory activities to ensure transparency and accountability.  
 
It seems somewhat peculiar that much of the advance in IRA’s auditing powers has been in 
response not to executive and Parliamentary demands for transparency per se but to the impact 
of scandal. It is often observed that the powers of IRAs have increased commensurately with 
regulatory failure. However, this is not that surprising given that the nature of regulation is both 
reactive and preventative and, in the case of Britain, that command law has often been usurped 
by a reliance on cooperation and trust (Hawkins 1984, pp191-4; Vogel 1996, pp146-92). As Ulrich 
Beck (1992) famously recognised, modern industrial societies have created new kinds of risks: they 
are catastrophic in effect, unknowable in advance and collective in their incidence (see also 
Moran 2001, p29). Scandal – whether corporate fraud or environmental crisis – inevitably leads to 
regulators’ expanding their controls and intensifying audit activity. Power (1997, pp134-8) has 
argued that, in many cases, regulations and audits have replaced trust as the mechanism through 
which the British Parliament and public receive assurances on financial administration. 
Privatisation and the power now vested in business by both governments and the general public 
has strengthened the underpinning idea that the regulatory state can and should manage the 
associated risks. This is a theme that recurs in the context of private sector corporate governance, 
to which we now turn.  
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2. Privatisation and shareholder value 
This second section looks at the key change that has occurred in the governance of the private 
sector as a result of the modern era of privatisation and financial deregulation. The intent is to 
recognise that many of the features identified in the operation of the regulatory state — focus, 
credibility, politicisation, outcomes, audits, risk and scandal — have also been prominent in the 
management and governance3 of publicly listed corporations. 
 
Beginning in the early 1980s, the revolution in private sector governance was based on the idea 
of ‘shareholder value’. The primacy of delivering the highest possible dividends to a company’s 
shareholders was based on the new effectiveness of the stock market in disciplining companies, 
attracting investment and democratising access to information about stocks. Several factors 
underpinned these changes. First, deregulation and innovation in the money markets worldwide 
produced a highly liquid and competitive system of corporate finance and performance (see 
Friedman 2000, pp53-60). The 1980s marked a sharp increase in both the availability of venture 
capital and the possibility of takeover as foreign entrants were allowed into the recently 
privatised markets of telecommunications, banking and airlines (Owen 2003). Second, 
privatisation led to a massive surge in the number of institutional4 and ‘retail’5 investors in the 
share market6, an increase in the liquidity of the share market and growth in governments’ 
coffers . Kay (2002, p22) notes that the sale of even half share in British Telecom was six times 
larger than any previous issue on the London Stock Exchange and the demand from private 
investment exceeded expectations such that the maximum allocation in the open offer was scaled 
back. The first two rounds of the Australian Telco float produced similar enthusiasm.  The overall 
level of share ownership in Australia increased from 15% of adults in 1992 to 54% in 1999 (ASX 
2002). Third, government regulations also contributed to the high level of indirect share 
ownership and the rise of the funds management industry as a key institutional investor. In 
Australia, for example, the 1992 Superannuation Guarantee Levy made salary contributions to a 
7
8
                                                 
3 I draw a distinction between management and governance as recognised by Tricker (1984). ‘The purpose 
of governance is not to manage but to gain an assurance that an organisation is well managed.’ 
4 Institutional investors are mainly pensions funds and mutual funds. 
5 By retail shareholders I mean investments by private citizens.  
6 The 2002 ASX study into share ownership found that half of all Australians owned shares – 37% directly, 
13% indirectly.   
7 In the UK between 1984 and 1996, the largest public flotations raised revenue of around 50 billion (at 
2000 prices) (Kay 2002, p22).  In Australia over the 1990s, over $95 billion was raised by Commonwealth 
and State Governments through privatisation, $45 billion of which was by public float (Walker 2000, p17). 
8 The first third of Telstra was sold for $14,330 billion at a first installment price of $1.95 per share. Within 
months, the share price had peaked in excess of $9 a share. 
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pension fund compulsory. The funds have offered various investment options for policy holders, 
which has made them indirect shareholders and enabled the funds to gain a major stake in other 
financial institutions. 
 
The principal-agent framework and functional focus 
Just as privatisation induced change to the Westminster style of governance by creating discrete 
agencies with competence in policy-making, regulation and service provision, it also focused the 
activities of the managers of publicly quoted companies. The ethos of ‘shareholder value’ was a 
significant break with the past. During Britain’s nineteenth-century experiment with privatisation, 
Conservative governments’ commitment to laissez-faire and company directors’ interests in 
preserving their own autonomy overrode shareholders’ interests. The joint-stock company was 
characterized by a large number of inactive shareholders, by increasingly specialist managers, and 
by increasingly transferable shares (Ireland 1999, pp38-9). Unfettered private enterprise was 
supported through limited liability legislation to attract more shareholder capital (Gamble and 
Kelly 2001, p111). There emerged agreement that business should not remain for specific purposes 
as endorsed by the state, but was the right of private citizens. Corporate property was private 
individual property which left British companies to operate without a legal framework. Even as 
the state grew in the 20th century, the political interest in the growth of corporations and the 
absence of mass shareholding meant that shareholders’ interests were left largely to the whim of 
directors. The enduring influence of these early developments ensured that corporations’ 
responsibilities were an internal matter, free from state or civil influence. The 1844 and 1856 
Companies Acts established the limited liability corporation in Britain and implied that the 
company was not made of its shareholders but made by them (Ireland 1999, p39).   
 
Beginning in the 1960s, the idea of company profits in the name of the company and its directors 
began to fade. In the UK, 1962 legislation established that only shareholders have exclusive claim 
to the companies’ residual assets in the event of liquidation. Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) have 
argued that shareholders own the company given that they bear the residual risk of the 
enterprise, because their funds can be seized by liquidators. These legal arguments have been 
strongly backed by ideological opposition to the idea of businesses’ having social responsibilities 
to those other than shareholders. Friedman famously simplified the goal of the corporation as ‘to 
make as much money for stockholders as possible’ (Friedman 1962, see also Hayek 1969). For 
auditors, company directors and shareholders alike, this argument is highly appealing for it serves 
the dual purpose of accountability and efficiency (Gamble and Kelly 2001, p110). It creates a 
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credible system that overcomes the principal-agent problem9 by connecting the interests of 
directors, managers and shareholders. If the share price rises, the board and shareholders are 
financially rewarded and the stock becomes more attractive to potential investors and less 
attractive to corporate raiders. If the share price falls, managers and shareholders lose financially 
and some shareholders may leave or they may remain if a takeover bid offers a higher price than 
the existing value of shares. As with the regulatory state, the logic of ‘shareholder value’ is to 
specialise and deliver outcomes. 
 
Politicisation and outcomes 
The private sector’s response to the challenge of ‘shareholder value’ has been to develop its own 
incentive and reward structure. The CEO of private corporations has assumed unprecedented 
responsibilities and has personified the activities and culture of the company. The accompanying 
scrutiny of the CEO’s performance by the Board, shareholders, the media and IRAs reflects the 
transformation of the office from a managerial to a political appointment. The US in particular 
has nurtured the ‘cult of the CEO’ and similar trends are apparent in Australia and the UK (see 
Haigh 2003). The ‘cult’ has essentially been a response to the new commercial environment. The 
increased threat of takeover in the 1980s was based on the innovation of ‘leveraged buy-out’ 
whereby the funds for takeover were promised by investment banks selling bonds secured on the 
company’s future earnings (Chancellor 2002, p29). In response, companies aligned CEOs’ 
remuneration with future performance on the sharemarket through stock options and long-term 
incentive plans (see Pass 2003, p21). This alignment made direct the CEO’s incentive for acting in 
shareholders’ interests and achieving contractual outcomes. CEOs were no longer empire-building 
managers but risk-taking entrepreneurs investing in shareholders’ and their own pecuniary gain. 
 
Some have argued that the rigour of financial markets, coupled with the alignment of managerial 
and shareholder interests is a sufficient framework for corporate governance (Sternberg 1996). 
The option that shareholders have to exit if their stock devalues is a better guarantor of company 
performance than their collective voice at meetings. Market governance also has appeal ‘as a 
practical matter […] the corporation cannot be managed by shareholder referendum [because] of 
the complexity of managing [its] affairs in fast-moving and ever-changing markets’ (OECD 1999).  
But these options of withdrawing ownership or ceding all decisions to management are at odds 
with the rise of shareholder activism and the development of corporate codes over the past 
                                                 
9  This problem arises when the owners of an asset are not the managers. 
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decade. Privatisation and the rise in the number of retail shareholders have been significant in 
shaping demands and avenues for shareholder participation. With half its adult population 
owning shares10 and the average size of portfolios over $A40,000 (ASX 2003), Australia is fast 
becoming the prototype of a strong shareholder democracy, underlining the need for managerial 
accountability. The number of citizens investing in the share market has intensified the forum of 
the annual general meeting and put pressure on governments to ensure that companies are 
regulated as much in the interests of healthy shareholder returns as they are for meeting the 
demands of other stakeholders. 
 
Transparency and trust  
Given the unprecedented interest in shareholding among retail and institutional investors, it is 
not surprising that the accountability standards governing publicly listed companies have 
increased. The codes of corporate governance devised by regulatory agencies and sharemarkets 
over the past fifteen years reflect the fact that market governance through shareholder activism 
is insufficient to control management. As discussed earlier, shareholder value is essentially about 
outcomes, not processes. As Section 3 will explain, the intense pressure to achieve short-term 
outcomes can corrupt the proper processes which are essential for the long-term health of 
companies. Shareholders’ activism is often inadequate to provide a proper check on companies’ 
activities. Companies cannot be run through shareholder plebiscite. Although legislation provides 
an opportunity to put questions to directors or make comment about the management of the 
company, small investors in large public companies are generally apathetic, while large 
institutional investments are more likely to leave a company that experiences management 
difficulties than they are to become involved (Dine 2000, p31). While dividends are accruing, both 
retail and institutional investors will unquestioningly trust a large public company’s internal 
controls and processes. Even if shareholder concern is aroused, the information asymmetries 
caused by the separation of ownership from control makes a thorough process of management 
accountability difficult. Shareholder ownership does not allow for an auditing role. 
 
The UK has had three major codes on corporate governance – the Cadbury  (1992), Greenbury  
(1995) and Hampel  (1998) Reports. All three emphasized the importance of appointing the right 
11 12
13
                                                 
10 - either directly or indirectly -  
11 Report on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Gee, London, 1992. 
12 Directors’ Remuneration: Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury, London, 1995. 
13 Committee on Corporate Governance Final Report, Gee, London, 1998. 
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people to board positions and ensuring sound structures for making decisions. Cadbury began the 
reform process by focusing on board cohesion and the auditing role of non-executive directors in 
reviewing the performance of the Board and directors. The Cadbury Report also recognised the 
importance of institutional investors for providing outside accountability. The Greenbury 
Committee sought to depoliticise the issue of remuneration by requiring the directors of a listed 
company to establish a remuneration committee, consisting of non-executive directors, that 
would determine company policy on executive payments. The criticism made of these first two 
reports focused on their two-tier approach to resolving the issue of board governance. The 
internal checks of non-executive Directors seemed to grate with the Report’s basic tenet that 
board effectiveness hinged on the ability of boards to work together (Cadbury 1992, p20 para 4.2; 
Dine 2000, p135). There was also negative reaction to the prescriptive nature of the Cadbury and 
Greenbury Reports which has recast corporate governance less in terms of compliance and more 
in terms of standards that will enhance business performance (Hampel 1998). 
 
These government-imposed internal checks on British companies were complemented by formal 
resolve among institutional investors to exercise greater pressure on corporate governance. As 
early as 1991, a report from the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee emphasized shareholders’ 
obligations ‘to exercise their commitment in a responsible manner’ and a responsibility ‘to actively 
intervene where necessary’ (Institutional Shareholders’ Committee 1991). It argued that 
institutional shareholders had a duty to check the power of executive Directors through ensuring 
the appointment of non-executives of appropriate calibre, experience and independence. A 
decade later, the Committee released its principles of best practice, governing the responsibilities 
of institutional shareholders and investment managers. These included: the publication of policies 
with respect to institutional shareholders’ active engagement with companies; monitoring the 
performance of companies; intervening where necessary; evaluating the impact of companies’ 
policies; and, in the case of investment managers, reporting back to the clients on whose behalf 
they invest (Institutional Shareholders’ Committee 2002). If companies persistently fail to respond 
to concerns, the Committee’s members will vote against the Board at General Meetings. 
 
There have been similar attempts at the internal reform of corporate governance in Australia. 
Reports and reform processes have focused on achieving auditing independence within company 
structures in the broader interests of transparency, accountability and shareholder activism. In 
2003, Guidelines produced by the Australian Council of Super Investors strongly supported the 
role of a two-tiered board through ‘skilled Independent Non-Executive Directors’ (ACSI 2003, p.4). 
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It listed specific attributes for this independence. In 2002, the Investment and Financial Services 
Association reviewed its corporate governance guidelines for fund managers and corporations 
covering issues of independence and competency of the Board of Directors, executive 
remuneration policy and disclosure guidelines. The Guidelines insist that ‘the Board should review 
its performance and the performance of individual directors, the company and management 
regularly. As a key part of that process, independent directors should meet on their own at least 
once annually to review performance’ (IFSA: Blue Book 2002, p6). As with UK corporate 
governance guidelines, the Australian approach has been to require compliance or explanation of 
non-compliance (IFSA Blue Book 9.4.2, p10; Hampel p10; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). This is 
supported by stringent disclosure requirements so that shareholders can form a view to either 
support the approach or advocate change. These issues of establishing transparency and trust in 
publicly listed companies are revisited in Part 4. 
 
Diagram 1 summarises the context so far. It identifies: 
 
• the common impetus of privatisation and financial deregulation 
• the establishment of a principal-agent framework as a credible governing structure 
• the politicisation of the role of agents (regulatory chief / CEO) due to pressure from 
principals to achieve outcomes 
• the adoption of private sector-style boards by regulatory agencies and legislation with a 
private sector emphasis 
• a greater role for internal auditors with National Audit Offices and Offices of Regulatory 
Review for regulatory agencies and institutional shareholder committees for corporations 
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3. Credibility crises in the regulatory state and PLCs 
I foreshadowed at the outset of this paper that the regulatory state and the model of shareholder 
value have both suffered institutional crises. There has not been a reversion to previous forms of 
public and private sector governance as a result. Nonetheless, the publicity generated by specific 
incidents has produced widespread debate and public concern about the reliability of the changes 
wrought by privatisation and market liberalisation and corresponding pressure for action. The 
purpose of this section is to emphasise that the frameworks of governance and reasons for crisis 
are common to both systems.  
 
Parts 1 and 2 of the paper recognised that executive governments’ delegation to regulatory 
agencies and board and shareholder delegation of managerial responsibilities to CEOs are both 
principal-agent frameworks whereby ownership is separated from control. In both cases, the 
rationale is the agent’s greater efficiency and possibility for the principal to externally audit. 
Importantly, while the agent is accountable to the principal, the principal is precluded from direct 
involvement in the agent’s day-to-day functions. As mentioned above, these conditions have been 
important for the credibility of the changes to both sectors over the past twenty or so years. 
Regulated industries require a credible independent watchdog to build trust among consumers 
and investors. Publicly listed companies, in addition to these external checks, have gained 
credibility through its internal controls and, in particular, the focus on delivering share value and 
disclosing information to shareholders. What has caused this credibility to decline? 
 
Overload and oversight  
A leading explanation is that the regulatory state has itself become overloaded. The demands 
placed on IRAs, through their charter and through wider government and community 
expectations, have been unrealistic. There are various dimensions to this idea of ‘overload’. The 
first is a fundamental paradox between delegation to IRAs in the interests of greater regulatory 
efficiency and the tendency of these agencies to over-police competition and expand social and 
environmental regulations to protect against perceived and actual risk (Moran 2001b, p30). 
Deregulation has clearly overcome the inefficiencies of nationalised monopolies, but delegation to 
agencies charged with specific regulatory duties has produced a strong executive mandate for 
IRAs to be vigilant in their audits. More pointedly, agency directors have recognised the 
importance of the power and legitimacy that comes from a reputation of regulatory vigilance. The 
laws and standards which support this power are notoriously slow to adapt to new risks. Second, 
in setting these regulatory standards, IRAs are increasingly captive to public expectations. The 
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modern electorate has responded to regulatory precedents and now demands a high level of 
protection across a far wider spectrum of economic activity. IRAs themselves have shaped these 
expectations about public and commercial services and in so doing have focused attention on 
their performance. Third, at the same time as political pressures have expanded IRAs’ scope and 
ambitions, scientific and financial innovations have stretched their resources to regulate 
effectively. Regulatory agencies have come to power in the UK and Australia at a time of 
increasing complexity, which has required greater sophistication to gauge and monitor risks and 
to enforce the necessary standards of compliance. Fourth, despite this accumulation of power, 
questions linger over whether IRAs are accountable and legitimate institutions, given that they 
clash with the Westminster tradition of ministerial responsibility (Moran 2001b, p31) and that 
there is no legal doctrine of independent agencies (Thatcher 2002, p127). The purely economic 
objectives defined in utility regulators’ charters often spill over into the social domain, which is 
properly the preserve of elected government (Prosser 1999, p199). 
 
Against this backdrop of ‘overload’, the credibility of the regulatory state has also suffered the 
well-known problems of ‘regulatory capture’ (Stigler 1971), in which a symbiotic relationship 
evolves between the specialist sectoral regulator and the regulated firm seeking concessions. The 
frequency of their dealings engenders trust which progressively loosens regulatory demands. The 
relationship may be coercive with the regulated firm offering future jobs to regulatory staff, 
limiting the information available to the regulator or even offering bribes (Prosser 1999, p203). 
The UK and Australia have both had major regulatory lapses, characterised by misplaced trust in 
elite financial institutions. The July 1995 collapse of Barings was the culmination of several 
financial disasters made possible by the Bank of England’s informal regulatory culture (Moran 
2001a, p421). The 2001 collapse of Australia’s second largest insurer HIH, and major currency 
trading losses incurred by the National Australia Bank in 2003-4 raised strong criticism that the 
regulator, the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA), was slow to act on warning 
signs, preferring to take a consultative approach. Subsequent inquiries found that APRA was 
under-resourced both in terms of the number of personnel and the experience and training of 
staff (Mealey 2002; Garnaut & Hughes 2004). 
 
The collapse of publicly listed companies has also been a product of overload and interference 
with companies’ internal governance frameworks.  As with the rationale for devolution to IRAs, 
there is an obvious paradox in the role of the internal auditor within a publicly listed company.  
On one hand, these auditors are charged with disclosing the correct information about the 
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company’s financial position to guide board decision-making. On the other, the general dynamic 
of company decision-making and performance criteria is to act in accordance with ‘shareholder 
value’. This trade-off became particularly sharp with the rapid enlargement of stock market 
capitalizations in the 1990s. The Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan (2002) noted 
that this enlargement:  
 
engendered an outsized increase in opportunities for avarice. An infectious greed seemed to 
grip much of our business community. Our historical guardians of financial information were 
overwhelmed. Too many corporate executives sought ways to “harvest” some of those stock 
market gains. As a result, the highly desirable spread of shareholding and options among 
business managers perversely created incentives to artificially inflate reported earnings in 
order to keep stock prices high and rising.  
 
Australian and UK PLCs were similarly influenced by high risk strategies that calibrated 
shareholder and executive remuneration on a steep upwards path without due regard for internal 
auditors’ cautions. The financial innovations of futures and derivatives enabled companies to 
spend tomorrow’s money today. The hubris surrounding these opportunities, their obfuscation on 
balance sheets, and the need for Australian PLCs to establish international footholds silenced 
auditors. CEOs, in their privileged position as a conduit of company information to the board, 
were given strong incentives to filter only positive information to the board (see Arbouw 2003, 
p7). The barometer of share price was substituted for the objectivity of auditors and risk 
management experts. ‘Regulatory capture’ may have been fuelled by the speculative frenzy on the 
sharemarket, but the conditions were generated by passive boards, unbalanced fiduciary 
incentives for CEOs and auditors’ distance from boards. Public criticism in the UK and Australia 
has inevitably centred on the incongruence of large payments to CEOs of underperforming PLCs. 
 
Risk management and averting crisis  
It is somewhat ironic that the financial crises of privatised utilities and large PLCs has tended to 
demote the role of IRAs in favour of political intervention. Regulators may well have day-to-day 
control of utilities, but financial crisis inevitably shifts power back to executive government.  The 
political imperative of ensuring the success of privatisation has forced governments to take over 
from regulators by offering financial carrots. Take the case of Victoria’s privatised rail and tram 
systems. When privatised in 1999, the British National Express Group won a 15-year contract. In 
February 2002, the State Labor government offered a $100 million rescue package to operators 
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but this was insufficient to prevent National Express leaving later that year. In February 2004, a 
package inexcess of $1 billion was offered to the remaining private carriers (Skulley 2004, p8). 
Not only has the State government by-passed the specialist regulator and interfered with the role 
of wider competition regulators, but its direct financial assistance to privatised utilities reflects 
that risk has not been passed on to private buyers. The British experience identifies similar trends.  
The privatised UK rail utility RailTrack collapsed due to poor management and a lack of public 
confidence. The government had foreseen this possibility upon privatisation and had established 
administrative rules to ensure a smooth handover to a new operator.  In the event, the rules failed 
to work as effectively as for failed private companies in competitive markets and the government 
was forced to make a payout to RailTrack shareholders (Kay 2002, p27). 
 
These elements of public risk and regulatory inadequacy also seem present in the reaction of 
executive government to the collapse of PLCs in competitive markets. The collapse of a key 
commercial service (eg: an airline) has often forced government to compensate staff and to 
conduct protracted public inquiries at taxpayer expense. Thereafter, British and Australian 
governments have responded by reforming the audit requirements of PLCs. This unrealistically 
inflates society’s expectations of auditors. Lansley (2002) has argued that the auditor’s role is not 
to guarantee the accuracy of financial information but to ensure that financial reports give a fair 
and true view of the company’s financial position and performance. While recent Government 
proposals in Australia give the impression that proper auditing can avert financial crises (see 
CLERP9 2002), auditors’ power only extends to biannual snapshots of financial records and not to 
continuous disclosure. In truth, the bulwark for better disclosure and compliance lies with the role 
of the board and CEO incentives schemes. Chancellor (2002, p32) is one of many who blames 
short-term options packages offered to CEOs, which ‘create an overwhelming incentive to 
manipulate earnings in order to inflate share prices’. Within the business community itself, debate 
has focused on the need to change relationships by promoting the role of non-executive 
independent directors and their access to internal auditors’ information through a pro-active 
board. Part 4 addresses this issue.  
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4. The challenges of corporate governance & stakeholder responsiveness 
At the same time as regulatory crises have prompted tighter standards and higher public 
expectations of auditors in IRAs and PLCs, there has also been an emphasis on the need for 
improved governance through better communication with a wider range of stakeholders and a 
wider range of policy tools. The argument is that improved transparency, accountability and 
integration is a panacea for any organisational type, but in particular those that are challenged by 
pressures causing overload, oversight and heightened risk. The impact of new corporate 
governance arrangements is potentially significant for IRAs and PLCs. In broad terms, the effect 
will be to narrow the spectrum between the contractarian shareholder and communitarian 
stakeholder models (see Schipani 2000). Regulation will still remain the key concern of IRA among 
pressures to implement soft law and use taxpayer money more strategically. Shareholder profits 
will still remain the prime concern of PLCs, among pressures to increase board involvement and 
respond to the corporate social responsibility agenda. 
 
The post-regulatory state 
Take the idea of the ‘post-regulatory state’. Recent scholarship in the UK and the US has noted 
the pervasiveness of non-state law, non-hierarchical control processes and the wider use of tools 
of public action (see Scott 2004, Salamon 2001). The argument is that command-based legal 
control is increasingly accompanied by unwritten standards flowing from extensive consultation 
between regulators, the regulated and the wider community. This consultation is particularly 
evident in the area of environmental regulation where there are many stakeholders in a newly 
created regulatory setting with frequent disagreement on scientific evidence and best practice 
(see Grant 2004). The complexity of public problems has progressively undermined the precision 
and detail of regulatory law (Cohn 2001) and required a greater involvement of non-state actors 
in regulatory governance. Braithwaite’s pyramid of regulatory compliance, with a suite of 
responses from self-regulation through education to prosecution, neatly represents the new 
environment of the post-regulatory state (1992, p35; see diagram 2). Regulatory compliance as an 
end in itself has been tempered by the financial expense of regulation and by challenges to the 
interpretation of the Act governing IRAs. In 2003, the Australian competition and consumer 
watchdog, the ACCC, suffered legal costs which blew its annual budget by A$10 million. The 
commitment by the regulator’s Chairman in 2004 was to be more selective and strategic in its 
prosecutions while ‘working more closely with small business so they have a better understanding 
of the sort of issues that we have to deal with in enforcing the Act’ (Samuel 2004). The British 
Office of Fair Trading is similarly emphasising the importance of deterrence, informal resolution 
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and raising business awareness as part of a non-regulatory approach (Bloom 2003). The challenge 
for IRAs generally is to reduce the burden of their regulatory responsibilities by promoting 
community engagement and participation in governance processes.   
 
 
This challenge is often presented as balancing performance with conformance.  This is potentially 
very difficult for regulators. The failure to promptly regulate where companies subsequently 
collapse or where companies’ actions injure the public interest will inevitably raise questions 
about the value of a regulatory body. On the other hand, regulators that spend large amounts of 
their budget to enforce compliance will often be questioned about whether their strategy best 
delivers value for public money. A judgement needs to be made as to whether resources are better 
spent on preventing a problem rather than on undertaking costly prosecutory action. The 
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literature on responsive regulation recommends empowering public interest groups ‘to oversee 
the regulator/regulated relationship and step in where there is undue evidence of capture of 
corruption (Dine 2000, p132; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, Ch.3). To this end, there is a clear role 
for facilitating technologies to inform industry, other government agencies, and the public at 
large of the regulator’s mindset.14  
 
The practical limitations of regulatory law and the trend of wider community engagement have 
also been reflected in challenges to the organisation of IRAs and the structure of government 
agencies at large.  The OECD (2002, p21, p27) comments that, while the creation of bodies with 
various degrees of separateness has ‘been a largely positive experience’, ‘one of the main 
challenges for central government is to maintain government and policy coherence across an 
increasing variety of organisational bodies’. Whereas regulatory agencies’ independence was once 
prized due to its associated impartiality, the emphasis of governance into the 21st century is on 
‘joined-up’ (UK) or ‘integrated government’ (Australia; see Management Advisory Committee 
2004). The negative coordination of the regulatory state is under challenge. Government 
departments in the UK and Australia are required to develop policy according to economic, social 
and environmental criteria which requires close collaboration with other agencies. Regulatory 
agencies are required to develop ‘whole of government’ strategies. The Australian Greenhouse 
Office, for example, was established as a separate agency within the environment portfolio to 
provide a whole of government approach to greenhouse matters. Bodies have also been 
established to monitor and coordinate regulatory impact across government. Both the UK and 
Australian governments have Offices that conduct regulatory impact assessments to oversee the 
reduction in regulatory measures which reduce competition.15 
 
These ‘post-regulatory’ developments have received tacit support in stakeholder approaches to 
regulation. The argument is that if regulators were to look beyond the bi-lateral relationship 
between themselves and the firm and see their role in terms of a wider network of relations 
involving competitors, consumers, employees and suppliers, the problems of regulatory capture 
and public skepticism of regulators would be overcome (Prosser 1999, p206). Souter (1995, p45) 
has argued that regulators should ‘adjust their regulatory instruments to ensure that outcomes 
                                                 
14 See The Commonwealth Centre for Electronic Governance, 
 .  See also ‘Modernising Government: How the NAO are 
responding’, National Audit Office, November 2000.  
http://www.electronicgov.net/about/index.shtml
15 The Australian body is The Office of Regulatory Review.   
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are not inconsistent with a desirable balance between the interests of different stakeholder 
groups’. To this end, government should be involved in identifying broad sectoral issues that 
regulators must heed. 
 
It is perhaps a symptom of the need (and often the inability) for IRAs’ to pay closer attention to 
stakeholder issues that governments have interfered in their regulatory role. Not surprisingly, 
political interference has often preceded regulatory failure. As Table 1 shows, many Australian 
regulatory agencies are governed by an Act requiring a corporate plan, a two-tiered board, 
compliance with financial and risk management standards, accountability of the CEO to the board 
and of the board to the Minister, and the expectation of communication with stakeholders and 
shareholders (see Horrigan 2001). The desire for more direct Ministerial control over boards can 
significantly affect corporate governance arrangements. The Australian Civil Aviation Safety 
Authority (CASA) is a case in point. In November 2002, the Federal Transport Minister announced 
reforms to corporate governance ‘intended to provide more direct control over CASA in relation 
to setting policy directions and priorities, performance standards, reporting and consultation 
processes, and stakeholder and industry advisory machinery’ (CASA Annual Report, 2002-03). The 
CASA board was abolished accordingly.  
 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility in PLCs 
Publicly listed companies have also faced pressures to integrate and widen their corporate agenda 
and to reform their governing structures. Over the past 5 years in particular, there has been acute 
interest in developing and codifying PLCs’ duties to their stakeholders – customers, employees, 
suppliers, the physical environment and the community at large. These stakeholder interests – 
broadly grouped under the rubric of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) – have gained greater 
academic and media attention in the wake of major corporate collapses. Some have argued ‘the 
death of shareholder value’, citing corporate scandals as evidence that corporate decision-making 
is guided by executive self-interest, not the interest of shareholders (Gittins 2002)16. Others urge a 
shift away from the American business model toward the stakeholder-based models of Germany 
and Japan (Kay 2003). Then there are those who acknowledge recent corporate failures but reject 
the intrusion of stakeholder interests as disorienting to corporate governance and potentially 
harmful to shareholders and stakeholders alike (Owen 2003). 
                                                 
16 Generic claims of incongruence between shareholder and company interests are found in 19th century 
English court judgements (see Dine 2000, p.31).  
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 What initiatives have advanced the CSR agenda in Australia and the UK? There have been various 
standards and indices proposed by a combination of government, stock market and civil society 
interests aimed at promoting corporate social and environmental responsibility. The UK has a 
government Minister for CSR, a stock market with CSR indices (FTSE4GOOD) and 700 corporations 
(many of them FTSE Top 100) volunteering to help community groups (Ryan 2003, p26). Australia 
has produced measurements of CSR through the firm ‘Reputation Measurement’, which has 
enlisted the support of two national broadsheets to focus public and business attention on how 
companies rank according to community expectations. At the same time, Australian PLCs are 
being urged to improve their corporate governance standards with the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) and Standards Australia International (SAI) producing rival corporate governance codes. The 
SAI’s is voluntary; the ASX’s is a condition of public listing.  In both cases, their appeal is the 
conferral of company reputability although the business community is wary of codes that go 
beyond basic principles (see Lahey 2002; Arbouw 2003, p7). 
 
This raises an important issue. The practicality of enhancing CSR must consider how standards of 
corporate governance accommodate these notions (see Horrigan 2002, p516 & p525). Herein lies a 
dilemma. On the one hand, corporate governance reform may focus purely on realigning 
shareholder with executive interests and reject prescriptive standards promoting wider 
stakeholder involvement. The British Hampel Report (1998, p10) described the objective of 
company control as ‘the preservation and greatest practicable enhancement over time of their 
shareholders’ investment’. In similar vein, Nick Grenier, former New South Wales Premier and 
board director of various companies, has argued that corporate governance guidelines should not 
interfere with the need for board directors to take a more active interest in managing shareholder 
relations (Arbouw 2003, pp7-8). There is a sense to these arguments that improvements in CSR 
will informally follow from deliberate efforts to promote better lines of internal corporate 
communication in the interests of the company and (therefore) shareholders. Meddling with the 
internal mechanics of PLCs to accommodate social and environmental interests can corrupt the 
capacity to deliver profit making, stock values and shareholder returns (see Sullivan and Conlon 
1977).   
 
On the other hand, there are no guarantees that corporate law and corporate governance reform 
will incorporate stakeholder interests. This does not satisfy those who insist on the 
interdependence of shareholder and stakeholder interests and the need for corporate governance 
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frameworks to recognise the importance of a wider range of stakeholders to the ongoing health 
of companies (Leader 1995). There is merit to the argument that recent corporate collapses reflect 
the inadequacy of shareholders alone to exercise proper checks on the CEO and board 
management. As with independent regulatory agencies, there have been attempts to 
reconceptualise the principal-agent framework of PLCs. Blair and Stout (1999, pp250-2) propose a 
‘mediating hierarchy’ of stakeholders and shareholders, whose negotiations with the corporations 
are subsequently passed on to the board for consideration. Instead of boards receiving their 
information from the CEO and shareholders individually, this team approach is designed to reflect 
and develop the holistic interests of corporations. Similarly, Turnbull (2003, pp36-7) proposes the 
use of Internet-based stakeholder panels that elect stakeholder councils to promote corporate 
legitimacy and guard against single interest capture.17 Here, there are clear parallels with the use 
of technologies to connect independent agencies to ‘whole of government’ issues and structures. 
 
Formal recognition of wider stakeholder interests in PLCs’ corporate governance frameworks 
seems unlikely even in the medium term. Australian and UK companies can expect more detailed 
standards for auditing and disclosure and higher penalties for failure to comply. Voluntary self-
regulation is also more likely as companies learn better strategies of communication between 
boards and CEOs. As for social and environmental standards, there is likely to be significant 
challenge to codified fusion of shareholder and stakeholder interests, reflected initially in 
continuing disagreement over the most appropriate system of rating and ranking (Ryan 2003). 
There is also the argument that joint public-private companies (eg: Telstra) should be fully 
privatised to protect shareholder interests, leaving government agencies to regulate their social 
obligations (Chaudri & Kerin 2004). Stakeholder issues within PLCs may pass the test of corporate 
accountability, but their pretense of greater legitimacy will always suffer from arguments that 
they undermine the role of the market environment.   
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has been interested in evolving patterns and rationales for governance in specific types 
of public and private sector organization that arose from the British and Australian experience 
with privatisation. On the evidence presented, there seems a case of ‘parallel evolution’ - where 
two related species or lineages have made similar evolutionary changes after their divergence 
                                                 
17 Turnbull does concede that Directors must be primarily accountable to shareholders. p36. 
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from a common ancestor (ISCID Encyclopedia). The two ‘related species’ - the agencies of the 
regulatory state and listed companies driven by shareholder value - both originated from the 
‘common ancestor’ of executive government following large-scale privatisation, financial 
deregulation and a surge in the number of institutional and individual shareholders.  
 
The similar ‘evolutionary changes’ may be sub-divided into three parts — structure, tension and 
current mindsets. In terms of structure, both have a principal-agent framework whereby the 
principal funds the agent and the agent works in the best interests of the principal. The agent is 
best placed to be efficient and responsive in meeting these interests; the principal is best placed 
to set broad parameters, monitor performance and intervene where necessary. In terms of tension, 
both public and private sector agents have suffered from pressures of overload caused by the 
demands of their respective principals and the demands of the other agent. CEOs and boards have 
been pressured by shareholder demands and highly competitive markets. Regulatory agencies 
have been pressured by executive government to achieve results. In turn, regulators have been 
pressured by a rapidly changing corporate world and companies have been pressured by the 
tighter requirements placed on them by regulatory agencies. In terms of current mindsets, there 
are striking similarities in the demands on public and private agents, with both pressured to be 
more communicative and receptive to a wider range of stakeholders. Regulatory agencies will be 
pressured by ministerial and departmental involvement in their operations and the diverse and 
more competitive claims of ‘the public interest’. Publicly listed companies will be tested by stricter 
standards of disclosure, the prospect of more proactive boards and the great unknown of 
corporate social responsibility. 
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